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admissible if it is a statement of opinion. The theory behind the
opinion rule is that wherever the witness can state the facts on which
he bases his opinion, the jury is equally competent to draw the infer-
ences and the witness' conclusion is superfluous.22 Wigmore in his
treatise on Evidence argues that the rule should not be applied to dying
-declarations because the declarant is dead and it is not possible to ob-
tain from him the data on which he based his inference.23 In Statc v.
Watkins24 the North Carolina Supreme Court, in effect, reached such
a result by holding that if there were any doubt as to whether the
declaration was opinion or fact the judge should submit it to the jury
with instructions to disregard it if they should find that it was intended
to be a: statement of opinion. The opinion rule is thus obviated because
once the evidence is submitted to the jury it is, practically speaking,
impossible for them to disregard it altogether even though they do de-
cide that it is a statement of opinion.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.
Evidence--Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies
As to Admissibility of Testimony.
H was charged with the murder of his wife, W, and his defense was
that the shot was fired accidentally. Over his objection the trial court
permitted a witness for the state to testify that immediately after the
shooting W had said that she was not going to live, that she wouldn't
live to get to the hospital if they didn't hurry, and that H had shot her.
W died three days after these statements were made. On appeal
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the evidence had been
properly admitted as a dying declaration.1
As a general rule the unsworn declarations of a deceased person are
admissible as an exception to the "hearsay rule" if made while the
declarant was fully aware of his impending death.2 In determining
whether a certain declaration falls within the exception the trial judge
must first make a finding of fact on which to base his decision.3 In the
instant case the only facts upon which he ruled that the declarant was
under an apprehension of death were those contained in the hearsay
'3 WIGmORF, EViDExCE (2nd ed. 1923) §1447.
3 WIGMOE, loc. cit. supra, note 22.
159 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 22 (1912). This rule was followed in: State v. Wil-
liams, 168 N. C. 191, 83 S. E. 714 (1914) ; State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E.
604 (1930).
Another peculiarity of this rule is that the jury is applying a rule of evidence.
Ordinarily the application of the rules of evidence is left to the trial judge. State
v. Williams, 67 N. C. 12 (1872).
1 State v. Carden, 209 N. C. 404, 183 S. E. 898 (1936).
- State v. Mills, 91 N. C. 581 (1884) ; Note (1936) 14 N. C. L. Ray. 380.
'State v. Williams, 67 N. C. 12 (1872).
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declaration itself, and the decision is thus open to the objection that the
finding of fact was predicated upon incompetent evidence. It may be
argued that there can be no better evidence to show that the declarant
was conscious of the nearness of death than the very fact that he did
die. However, the court did not seem to rely upon that evidence, and it
is rendered impotent by the fact that three days elapsed between the
making of the statement and the declarant's death.
If, as Professor Wigmore contends,4 the rules of evidence are not
employed in preliminary hearings before the court this objection is
obviated. The basis of the Wigmorean theory is that the rules of
evidence were formulated for the protection of the jurors and that there
is no comparable necessity for protecting the judge when he sits as the
trior of the facts. However, certain commentators have indicated that
Wigmore is not in accord with the weight of authority and that the
foundation of his theory is questionable.5 But what of the North Car-
olina situation? Are the rules of evidence applicable in the North Car-
olina courts when the judge is receiving testimony on which to make a
finding of fact preliminary to determining the competency of certain
evidence for the jury?
Apparently the North Carolina courts do apply the rules of evidence
in preliminary hearings of this nature. Although no direct authority
could be found a study of the procedure followed in certain cases indi-
cates that such is the practice. For example, in State v. Tilghmano the
"opinion rule" was applied in a preliminary hearing held to determine
the admissibility of a dying declaration.. The "hearsay rule" was em-
ployed in Justice z. Luther7 to reject parol proof of the contents of a
writing when the only evidence that it had been lost was the unsworn
declaration of the person in whose hands the writing had been deposited
for safekeeping. The rule that the declarations of an agent cannot be
'1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 1923) §4b; 3 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (2nd ed.
1923) §1385.
'Maguire and Epstein, Rides of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to
Admissibility (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1101; Note (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 258.
33 N. C. 513 (1850). In deciding whether the declarant was under an appre-
hension of death the court refused to consider the testimony of the declarant's
wife to the effect that in her opinion he did not think he was going to die. On
appeal this action was approved.
See State v. Layton, 204 N. C. 704, 169 S. E. 650 (1933). In the preliminary
hearing the court allowed a doctor to testify that in his opinion the declarant
thought she was going to die. On appeal this testimony was held to be an im-
material error because the declarant had also stated her belief that she was dying.
The "opinion rule" was likewise employed in Avery v. Stewart, 134 N. C. 287,
46 S. E. 519 (1904) where the plaintiff was trying to establish the loss of a written
instrument so that he could prove its contents by oral testimony.
94 N. C. 793 (1886). Smith, C. J., said, "The loss of the paper, traced to
the hands of a depository, cannot be proved by his unsworn declaration of the fact.
The evidence addressed to the court, must be reasonably sufficient to account for
the absence of the original, and this must be under oath, not hearsay."
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used to establish the fact of the agency was applied in Jennings v. Hin-
ton8 as the basis for the exclusion of certain preliminary testimony. It
was argued in Johnson v. Prairie9 that the admission of certain declara-
tions of an alleged agent was not error because they were offered, not
to the jury, but for the consideration of the court. The court held that
if the evidence was not competent for the jury, it would not be proper
for the court in deciding the competency of other testimony to act upon
it. In State v. Whitener' o the court held that in a preliminary hearing
to determine the admissibility of a confession the defendant has a right
to introduce evidence to show that it was not made voluntarily, and by
way of dicta said, "It is the duty of the judge to hear all such cmn-
petent evidence on this preliminary question as the defendant may see
fit to offer." In certain other cases there is language to the effect that
the judge's finding of fact preliminary to the admission of evidence is
conclusive on appeal but what evidence he allows to establish those facts
is a question of law subject to review. 11 What measuring rod will the
appellate court use other than the common law rules of evidence?
8128 N. C. 214, 38 S. E. 863 (1901). The wife assigned her interest as
beneficiary in a life insurance policy upon her husband's life to the defendant,
mortgagee of the husband's property. Later there was an absolute sale of the in-
terest in the policy, and the wife now seeks to have the sale cancelled for fraud.
While on the stand the wife was asked whose agent her husband was on the day
the sale was made, and she answered that he was the defendant's agent. She was
then asked what he said on that occasion. The defendant objected, and the court
ruled that the question was improper. The ruling was based upon the reasoning
that the second question was not proper if the first was incompetent, and the first
was incompetent because the only information upon which the wife could have
based her answer was what her husband, the alleged agent, had told her.
991 N. C. 159 (1884).
- 191 N. C. 659, 132 S. E. 603 (1926). The result of this case was approved
and followed in State v. Blake, 198 N. C. 547, 152 S. E. 632 (1930).
It should tbe noted that the language quoted from this case was a portion of a
longer excerpt quoted with approval by the North Carolina Supreme Court from
State v. Kinder, 96 Mo. 548, 10 S. W. 77 (1888). The italics were inserted by the
author of this note.
A similar case is State v. McRae, 200 N. C. 149, 156 S. E. 800 (1931) where
the defendant was charged with murder. In the preliminary hearing to determine
the competency of the defendant's alleged confession an officer testified that the
prisoner made the confession voluntarily after his wife had related the entire
story to the officers in the prisoner's presence. The court ruled that the confession
was properly admitted and that ihis procedure did not violate the rule that a wife
cannot testify against her husband.
" State v. Andrew, 61 N. C. 205, 206 (1867). Pearson, C. J., said, "What facts
amount to such threats or promises as make confessions not voluntary and admis-
sible in evidence is a question of law, and the decision of the judge in the court
below can be reviewed by this Court; so what evidence the judge should allow to
be offered to himr to establish those facts is a question of law. So whether there
be any evidence tending to show that the confession was not made voluntarily is
a question of law. But whether the evidence is true and proves, these facts, and
whether the witnesses giving testimony to the court touching these facts are en-
titled to credit or not, and in case of conflict of testimony which witness should be
believed by the court, are questions of fact to be decided by the judge, and his
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In view of these authorities which indicate that the North Carolina
courts do apply the rules of evidence in preliminary hearings the ruling
in the instant case appears subject to a "legal criticism." That ruling,
however, is supported -by numerous decisions involving both dying
declarations and other exceptions to the hearsay rule in which the facts
upon which the judge ruled the evidence admissible were established by
the hearsay declaration itself.12 It is anomalous that in these cases the
opportunity to apply the rules of evidence has been consistently refused,
but this can probably be explained by the fact that the dying declarant's
own statement is the best and often the only evidence of his knowledge
of his condition. If the rules of evidence were applied in the prelim-
inary hearing to exclude such statements the number of cases in which
dying declarations could be successfully introduced would be materially
decreased. Now, in the first place, the reasons for allowing the jury to
consider the unsworn and uncrossexamined statements of a dead man
were necessity and public policy,' 3 and in view of these motives the
court's inconsistency can be justified.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.
decision cannot be reviewed in this Court, which is confined to questions of law."
(Italics by the author of this note.)
Similar language can be found in the opinion written by Walker, 3., in Avery
v. Stewart, 134 N. C. 287, 292, 46 S. E. 519, 521 (1904).
Support for the contention that the rules of evidence do apply in preliminary
hearings before the judge may be found in the language used in the following
cases: Smith v. Kron, 96 N. C. 392, 396, 2 S. E. 533, 535 (1887) ; Gillis v. Wil-
mington, Onslow, and Eastern Carolina Ry. Co., "108 N. C. 441, 443, 13 S. E. 11,
12 (1891).
2' (a) Dying declarations: Dellinger v. Elliott Building Co., 187 N. C. 845, 123
S. E. 78 (1924) ; State v. Wallace, 203 N. C. 284, 165 S. E. 716 (1932) ; State v.
Deal, 207 N. C. 448, 177 S. E. 332 (1934).
(b) Declarations evidencing present pain: Howard v. Wright, 173 N. C. 339,
91 S. . 1032 (1917) ; Martin v. Hanes Co., 189 N. C. 644, 127 S. E. 688 (1925).
It should be pointed out that the North Carolina Supreme Court has apparently
abandoned the requirement that the declaration must relate solely to present pain.
See Moore v. Summers Drug Co., 206 N. C. 711, 175 S. E. 96 (1934) ; Comment
(1935) 13 N. C. L. Rv. 228.
(c) Declaration against interest: Patton v. Dyke, 33 N. C. 237 (1850) ; Whit-
ford v. North State Life Ins. Co., 163 N. C. 223, 79 S. E. 501 (1913).
(d) Declarations as a part of the res gestae: (1) Statement of present per-
ception-Harrill v. S. C. and Ga. Extension Ry. of N. C., 132 N. C. 655, 44 S. E.
109 (1903). (2) Spontaneous declaration-State v. Spivey, 151 N. C. 676, 65
S. E. 995 (1909) ; Harrington v. Commissioners of Wadesboro, 153 N. C. 437,
69 S. E. 399 (1910) ; Young v. Stewart, 191 N. C. 297, 131 S. E. 735 (1926).
(e) Confessions (although confessions are not really among the bona fide ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule they are included here because the problem discussed
-in this note is sometimes present in cases involving them) : State v. Cruse, 74 N.
C. 491 (1876) ; State v. Sanders, 84 N. C. 729 (1881) ; State v. Page, 127 N. C.
512, 37 S. E. 66 (1900).
Barfield v. Britt, 47 N. C. 41 (1854) ; State v. Jefferson, 125 N. C. 712, 34
S. E. 648 (1899).
